Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2008

The "Stern Review" and its Critics: Implications for the Theory and
Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis
Daniel H. Cole
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dancole@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cole, Daniel H., "The "Stern Review" and its Critics: Implications for the Theory and Practice of BenefitCost Analysis" (2008). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 356.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/356

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

DANIEL H. COLE*

The Stern Review and Its Critics:
Implications for the Theory and
Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis
ABSTRACT
The United Kingdom Treasury's Stern Review: The Economics
of Climate Change was the first economic analysis of climate
change to be sponsored by a government agency. The Review
provedhighly controversialbecauseit reacheddramaticallydifferent
conclusions andpolicy recommendationsthan most earliereconomic
analyses of climate change. Several prominent economists,
including William Nordhaus, ParthaDasgupta,Richard S.1. Tol,
Robert Mendelsohn, and Martin Weitzman, have criticized the
Stem Review on variousgrounds, including its damage estimates
and selection of parametervalues, including the utility discount
rate and the elasticity of marginalutility, which affect the interest
rate at which future costs and benefits are discounted to present
value. This article summarizes the Stem Review and its critiques
and assesses them from a process-orientedperspective to determine
what they can teach us, positively and negatively, about how
benefit-cost analyses should (or should not) be done.

Every cost-benefit analysis is an exercise in subjective
uncertainty. If, as the Stern Review puts it, "climate change is
the greatest externality the world has ever seen," then a costbenefit calculation of what to do about it is the greatest
exercise in Bayesian decision theory that we economists have
ever performed.
Martin Weitzman 1

R. Bruce Townsend Professor of Law, Indiana University School of LawIndianapolis. The author is grateful to Martin Weitzman for providing successive drafts of
various working papers; to Peter Grossman, Ian Hodge, Kerry Krutilla, Elinor Ostrom, Tim
Swanson, Richard Tol, and Martin Weitzman for their helpful comments and suggestions on
drafts of this paper; to the participants in the 2007 Benefit-Cost Analysis Conference at the
University of Washington, especially the conference organizer Richard Zerbe; and to audiences
at the UCLA Law School, the Canadian Law and Economics Association, and the Midwest Law
and Economics Association.
1. Martin Weitzman, A Review of the Stem Review on the Economics of Climate Change,
45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 717 (2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the United Kingdom's Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Gordon Brown, appointed Nicholas Stem, an Oxford economist and former
World Bank chief economist and senior vice president, as second permanent
secretary at Her Majesty's (HM) Treasury. Two years later, Chancellor
Brown asked Secretary Stem to head up an official governmental review of
the economics of climate change. The UK Treasury published the Stem
Review on the Economics of Climate Change on October 30,2006.2 It was not
the first benefit-cost analysis (BCA) on climate change ever,3 but it was the
first such analysis to be issued with the imprimatur of a major government.
Consequently, the Stern Review had unusually high political salience and
potential to influence policy.
Unsurprisingly, politicians and NGOs that favor rapid and strong
action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions greeted the nearly 600-page
Stem Review with uncritical adulation, while climate-change skeptics
summarily bashed it.4 More serious academic critiques of the Review were
not long in coming. Several well-respected economists have argued that the
Review's assumptions, arguments, and recommendations are seriously
flawed, even biased,' while others have read the Review more generously.6

2.

NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007),

availableathttp://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independenLreviews/sternreview-economnics_
climate.change/sternreviewjreport.cfm.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992); Robert 0.
Mendelsohn et al., Country-SpecificMarket Impacts of Climate Change, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 553
(2000); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH G. BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS
OF GLOBAL WARMING (2000).
4. CTR. FOR SC. & PUBLIC POL'Y, THE STERN REPORT: SOME EARLY CRITICISMS (2006),

http://ff.org/centers/csspp/pdf/20061104_stem.pdf;

LEONARDO RIBON, REVIEW OF THE

REACTIONS GENERATED BY THE RELEASE OF THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (2006), http://www.global.rmit.edu.au/GS@RMIT%20Review%20of%20Reactions

%20to%20Stem%20DecO6.pdf.
5. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stem Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686 (2007); Partha Dasgupta, Commentary: The Stem Review's
Economics of Climate Change, 199 NATL INST. ECON. REV. 4 (2006); David Maddison, Further
Comments on the Stern Review (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Robert 0.
Mendelsohn, A Critique of the Stern Report, 29 REGULATION 42 (Winter 2006-2007); Richard S.J.
Tol, The Stem Review of the Economics of Climate Change: A Comment, 17 ENERGY & ENV'T 977
(2006); Gary W. Yohe, Some Thoughts on the Damage Estimates Presentedin the Stem Review - An
Editorial,6 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT J. 65 (2006); Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J. Tol, The Stem
Review: Implicationsfor Climate Change, 49 ENVIRONMENT 36 (2007).
6. See, e.g., John Quiggin, Stem and the Critics on Discounting (Dec. 20, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), availableat http://johnquiggin.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/
12/stemreviewed06121.pdf; Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate Change:A Challenge to Policy, 4
ECONOMIsTS' VOICE (Special Issue) 1 (2007), availableat www.bepress.com/ev (go to "Special
Issues: Climate Change"); Thomas Sterner & U. Martin Persson, An Even Sterner Review:
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In perhaps the most nuanced and interesting of all the reviews, Martin
Weitzman deftly criticizes the Stern Review's assumptions and analysis, but
goes on to suggest why, ultimately, the Review's conclusions might be
sound.7 Weitzman's analysis, in particular, has important implications for
the practice of BCA as it applies to policies like climate change, which
involve long time horizons, potentially catastrophic levels of harm, and
very high levels of uncertainty.
One purpose of this article is to critically assess the Stern Review and
its various reviews. Another is to explain that the disagreements over the
quality of the Stern Review (among serious scholars without ostensible
political or ideological agendas) largely reflect disagreements about how
BCAs generally should- and should not-be done. To that end, the article
focuses on the Stern Review's BCA from a process-oriented perspective and
asks what producers and consumers of benefit-cost analyses can learn from
the Stern Review and its critics about the theory and practice of benefit-cost
analysis. The lessons are several, including many negative lessons about
how benefit-cost analyses should not be done. Less obvious, but just as
important, are one or two positive lessons from the Stern Review. The
lessons, both positive and negative, relate to the selection of parameter
values, including discount rates, and methods of estimating damages.
Section 2 explicates the Stern Review's model, arguments,
conclusions, and recommendations. Section 3 examines the scholarly
commentary on the Stern Review, most of which has been highly critical. In
particular, commentaries have criticized the Stern Review's damage
estimates and selection of parameter values, the elements that determine the
social discount rate (the pure rate of time preference, the elasticity of
marginal utility, and the rate of growth of consumption). Section 4 explores
the implications of those criticisms, as well as the arguments made by Sir
Nicholas Stem and his co-authors, for the theory and practice of BCA.
Although there is no official set of "best practices" for BCA, this
article operates on the assumption that virtually all economists would agree
that transparency and replicability are the twin sine qua non of BCA.' More
than anything else, the former requires that assumptions are explicit and the
later requires that all relevant data are provided so that other analysts can

IntroducingRelative Pricesinto the DiscountingDebate1-21 (Resources for the Future, Discussion
Paper No. 07-37, 2007), Eric Neumayer, A Missed Opportunity: The Stern Review on Climate
Change Fails to Tackle the Issue of Non-Substitutable Loss of Natural Capital (Apr. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=980740.
7. Weitzman, supranote 1, at 705.
8. For a history of BCA in the United States (at the federal level) and an assessment of
current practices in light of potential "best practices," see Daniel H. Cole, "Best Practice"
Standardsfor Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis, 23 RES.L. & ECON. 1 (2007).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

verify the calculations. The article concludes with some thoughts about the
Stern Review's overall significance for both BCA methodology and the
economic analysis of climate change.
II. A SUMMARY OF THE STERN REVIEW
The Stern Review does three things: (1) assesses the likely costs of
climate change up to 2200 under a "business as usual" (BAU) policy, where
nothing is done to control emissions rates or atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases (GHGs); (2) estimates the costs and benefits of various
levels of emissions mitigation and climate stabilization; and (3) evaluates
policy options in light of the analyses from (1) and (2).
A. The PAGE2002 Model
Assessing the costs of climate change requires a special kind of
model that integrates scientific and economic information about GHG
emissions, atmospheric concentrations, and impacts. The goal of an
"integrated assessment model" (IAM) is to simulate the process of climate
change starting from GHG emissions through atmospheric concentrations
to climate effects and ultimately the socio-economic impacts of climate
change.9 The Stern Review uses an IAM developed by Chris Hope called
PAGE2002.'° Chapter 6 of the Stern Review provides some (but not all")
relevant details of the PAGE2002 model and how it was employed to derive
climate change damage functions under various GHG emission trajectories.
The model measures socio-economic impacts of climate change in
terms of differential per capita income growth rates under various scenarios
ranging from zero climate change, at one extreme, to BAU at the other.
Between those two limits lies a continuum of points/levels at which GHG
emissions are mitigated and atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 are
stabilized. The precise relations between GHG emissions, atmospheric

9. Put differently, "[a]n IAM is essentially a model of economic growth with a
controllable externality of endogenous greenhouse warming." Martin Weitzman, Structural
Uncertaintyand the Value of StatisticalLife in the Economics of CatastrophicClimate Change28 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13490, 2007), availableat http://papers.nber.
org/papers/w13490.
10. "PAGE" stands for "Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect." See STERN, supra note
2, at 173; Chris Hope, The Marginal Impact of C02 from PAGE2002: An Integrated Assessment
Model Incorporatingthe IPCC"s Five Reasons for Concern, 6 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT J. 19 (2006),
availableat http://journals.sfu.ca/int-assess/index.php/iaj/article/view/227.
11. The failure to discuss all relevant details of the model, itself, can be considered a
possible violation of "best practices" for BCA, especially given the overall importance of the
choice of model to the outcome of the BCA. However, all relevant details about the model are
available in Hope, supranote 10, on which this summary of the Stern Review relies extensively.

Winter 2008]

THE STERN REVIEW

concentration levels, climate changes, and the human-health and socioeconomic effects of those changes are, of course, subject to high levels of
uncertainty, which increase with time. Among other uncertainties is the
prospect of a nonlinear damage function resulting from extreme climate
events, climate feedback mechanisms, and other large-scale discontinuities. 2 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Third
Assessment Report (TAR) had previously expressed serious concern over
such impacts; 3 Hope designed PAGE2002 precisely to incorporate them. 4
The PAGE2002 IAM factors uncertainty into the analysis by
incorporating a Monte Carlo analysis that repeatedly solves the model
using 79 random variables for key parameters. 5 Those variables include
(among others) emissions of primary GHGs, atmospheric concentrations of
GHGs, concentrations of sulfate aerosols that cool the atmosphere, regional
temperature effects for eight regions of the world, nonlinear and transient
damages, regional economic growth, investments in climate change
adaptation measures, and the possibility of some future, large-scale
discontinuity. 6 The model is run 1000 times to generate "a range of possible
trajectories for GDP per capita net of climate change related damage
costs." 17 It then produces a probability density function of damage outcomes for various GHG emission levels over time. 8
It was precisely this ability of the PAGE2002 IAM to incorporate
nonlinear damage functions, including potential catastrophic events, and
nonmarket costs that evidently led the Stem Review's authors to adopt that
model rather than alternative IAMs.' 9 Various statements throughout the

12. The term "discontinuity" in this context refers to a dramatic, non-linear increase in the
damage function resulting from a potentially catastrophic event, such as the collapse of the
West-Antarctic ice sheet. Richard Posner defines a "catastrophe" as "harm so great and sudden
as to seem discontinuous with the flow of events that preceded it." RICHARD A. POSNER,
CATASTROPHE 6 (2004).

13. See

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2001, IPCC

THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT, IMPACTS, ADA'TION AND VULNERABILITY (2001) [hereinafter IPCC
THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT].
14. Hope, supra note 10, at 20.
15. Id. at 36-37, app. I.
16. Id. at 20-21.
17. Maddison, supra note 5, at 4.
18. In simple terms, a "probability density function" is normally (but not always) a bellshaped curve that describes the various probabilities of occurrence (or non-occurrence), which
must sum to 1 (or 100 percent). For a more accurate but technical definition, see, for example,
MERRAN EVANS Er AL., STATISTICAL DISTRIBuTIONS 9-11 (3d ed. 2000).
19. In contrast to PAGE2002, the IAM used by Mendelsohn et al. does not account for nonmarket impacts or catastrophic events. Mendelsohn et al., supra note 3, at 567. However,
contrary to assertions made by STERN, supra note 2, at 171, fig. 6.3, other available models seem
quite similar to PAGE2002. See, e.g., Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the Costs of Climate ChangePartII: Dynamic Estimates, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 2064 (2002); NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 3.
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Stern Review signal an intention to estimate not only the mean expectedvalues of climate change damage, but higher harm-based scenarios as well.
For example, Stem and his colleagues write that "the science and economics
are particularly sparse precisely where the stakes are highest - at the high
temperatures we now know may be possible."2" Later, they state that "the
knowledge base on which the cost of climate change is calibrated specialized studies on impacts on agriculture, ecosystems and so on -is
particularly patchy at high temperatures. In principle, the gaps that remain
may lead to underestimates or overestimates of global impacts. In practice,
however, most of the unresolved issues will increase damage estimates."21
The Stern Review then criticizes earlier studies for limiting their analyses "to
a small subset of the most well understood, but least damaging, impacts. " '
In effect, earlier analysts looked only where the light was better, ignoring
impacts "that have the potential to inflict the greatest damage" simply
because those impacts were "surrounded by the greatest scientific
uncertainty."' Thus, the Stern Review seems to have been intended, at least
in part, as a BCA of worse-case scenarios for climate change.24
In addition to facilitating the incorporation of large-scale
discontinuities in the damage function, PAGE2002 was consistent with the
scientific projections of the IPCC's TAR, falling short by only about 40 ppm
of CO 2 concentration at the IPCC's mean projection (under BAU) of 700 to
800 parts per million (ppm) for the year 2100. PAGE2002's fifth percentile
and ninety-fifth percentile projections were also very close to the outer
bounds of the IPCC's TAR projections. 2'
Among the important projections of the IPCC's TAR, which
profoundly influenced both the PAGE2002 IAM and the Stern Review's final
assessment, was the finding that the impact of a large-scale discontinuity

20. STERN, supra note 2, at 34.
21. Id. at 149.
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id. at 151.
24. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 705, appears to agree with this assessment in noting that
"the Stern Review consistently leans toward (and consistently phrases issues in terms of)
assumptions and formulations that emphasize.. .pessimistically high expected damages from
greenhouse warming -relative to most other studies of the economics of climate change."
Whether or not the Stem Review's worse-case approach comports with (presumed) "best
practices" in regulatory BCA is a question addressed later in this article.
25. It is worth wondering why the Stern Review was published just months before the
IPCC released its Fourth Assessment Report (FAR) in 2007, which significantly altered some of
the projections made in the 2001 TAR. The Stern Review's authors incorporated into their model
a good deal of the science on which the FAR is based. However, they could not await the FAR's
publication because they were operating under an autumn 2006 deadline set by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer.
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might exceed ordinary disasters by orders of magnitude.' The chance of
large-scale discontinuities is estimated to be significant only after the mean
temperature has risen 51°C over pre-industrial levels, but for every 11C0
rise above that point, the chance of a large-scale discontinuity increases by
ten percent.27 PAGE2002 presumes that any discontinuous event would
entail a ten percent loss to European Union gross domestic product (GDP).
In recognition that other regions of the world would suffer greater or lesser
losses (or even make gains) from higher-than-expected temperature
changes, expected income affects are weighted to allow for comparison and
aggregation across regions. 28
Because of the great uncertainties in the occurrence and effects of
large-scale discontinuities, PAGE2002 provides wide parameter ranges. But
as Hope and Stem both note, 29 it is important not to ignore large-scale
discontinuities in estimating the economic effects of climate change just
because they are subject to great uncertainty. Their intuition seems right: it
is better to incorporate wide parameter ranges with high margins of error
than to virtually ensure large errors by summarily excluding large-scale
discontinuities from the damage function.'
B. Applying the Model
1. Estimating the Size and Distributionof Climate ChangeCost
The Stem group ran the PAGE2002 model under two different
assumed levels of climatic response to BAU (no controls on present or
future emissions rates) (1) the "baseline" scenario designed to give outputs
consistent with the IPCC's Third Assessment Report and (2) a "high
climate" scenario that adds the risk of nonlinear damages, resulting for
example from natural feedbacks in the climate system. Obviously, the "high
climate" scenario results in a higher probability of larger temperature
changes and, consequently, higher expected social costs. According to Stem,
"In the high scenario, global mean temperature rises to an average of nearly
4.3°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, compared with an average of
3.9°C above pre-industrial levels in the baseline scenario."31 And the
temperature difference between the two scenarios increases after 2100. By
2200, the average increase in mean global temperatures increases by 7.4"C

26. An "order of magnitude" is a scaled comparison of (sometimes approximate) amounts
using a fixed ratio. So, for example, 102 (100) is one order of magnitude greater than 101 (10);
10' (1000) is two orders of magnitude greater than 10' (10).

27. IPCC THIRD ASsEssMENT
28.
29.
30.
31.

REPORT,

supra note 13, at 947.

Hope, supra note 10, at 23-24.
Id. at 25; STERN, supra note 2, at 170.
As we shall see later, Weitzman seems to agree.
STERN, supra note 2, at 158.
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above pre-industrial levels on the baseline scenario, and by 8.6°C on the
"high climate" scenario. 32 The Stem Review warns that temperature
increases, especially beyond the year 2100, should be treated as "indicative"
only because uncertainty about effects increases with time.33 But the
Review's authors ignore their own words of caution in deriving preliminary
estimates of average losses in global per capita GDP in 2200 ranging from
5.3 percent to 13.8 percent, "depending on the size of climate-system
feedbacks and what estimates of 'non-market impacts' are included. " 4They
do, however, add the important caveat that "growth in GDP will have made
the world considerably richer than it is now."35 This is significant because
a certain percentage reduction in GDP will hurt a relatively poor country
more than a relatively rich one. A five percent loss to a $1 trillion economy
is greater in nominal terms than a similar percentage loss to a $1 billion
economy; but the effect on the $1 billion economy is likely to be more
significant.
The size of climate change costs is not the only important consideration. The distribution of those costs also matters. The Stem group
notes, in accordance with virtually every other analyst, 6 that the costs of
climate change will not be distributed evenly or randomly throughout the
world. Rather, the costs are expected to fall most heavily in less developed
regions of the world that, until now, have contributed least to GHG
emissions and can least afford to bear the costs of climate change. "[In the
baseline-climate scenario with all three categories of economic impact
[market, risk of catastrophe, and non-market], the mean cost to India and
South-East Asia is around 6 percent of regional GDP by 2100, compared
with a global average of 2.6 percent."37 The inequitable distribution of
climate change costs introduces an important ethical component into
climate change policy, which the Stem Review does not neglect.
2. The Choice of ParameterValues
In deriving its damage figures, the Stem Review employs standard
economic assumptions from welfare economics theory, including the
assumption of diminishing marginal utility of income in evaluating risks
and future welfare. But then Stem deliberately courts controversy by
choosing a very low pure rate of time preference (utility discount rate) of 0.1

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 157-159.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 155.
See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense?, in T.C. SCHELLING,

STRATEGIES OF COMMIMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 34-35 (2006).

37. STERN, supra note 2, at 179.
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percent per year.' A discussion of the controversy over that very low rate
is postponed until the next section. For present purposes it is important to
understanding the proper role the utility discount rate plays in the Stern
Review's calculations. In particular, we need to distinguish carefully
between pure rate of time preference and the interest rate used to discount
consumption.39
In Frank Ramsey's modem formulation of Irving Fisher's dynamic
general equilibrium model of the interaction of preferences and
technological change,
r = p+ 17g,
where r is the interest rate that discounts consumption, p is the pure rate of
time preference, q is the elasticity of marginal utility or the base-case
coefficient of relative risk aversion (a measure of what someone would be
willing to pay today to insure against an expected future loss),' and g is the
per-capita growth rate of consumption.4' In the Stem Review, p = 0.1%, q =
1, and g = 1.3% Plugging these figures into the Ramsey equation gives us a
value of r (the discount rate of consumption) = 1.4%. The choice of low
values for p and q inevitably results in a low r. The Stern Review's r = 1.4%
leads to estimated damage costs 100 years from now that exceed by two
orders of magnitude estimates using r = 6% (e.g., where p, ;7, and g each

=2).42

Based on its preferred parameter values, the Stern Review's analysis
shows that under BAU (uncontrolled GHG emissions indefinitely into the
future) the risks of climate change between 2100 and 2200 will be equivalent
to about five percent of the gross global product each year, and possibly as

38. Virtually everyone would rather receive a dollar today than a dollar tomorrow or five
years from now. A dollar in hand today can be invested at some positive rate of interest so that
it will be worth more than a dollar tomorrow and worth much more than a dollar five years
from now. The "pure rate of time preference" or "utility discount rate" is an estimate of the
interest rate at which individuals discount the value of money over time.
39. See Weitzman, supra note 1, at 706.
40. Quiggin, supra note 6 (explaining the effect of the choice of r7(eta): "Using eta = 1, a
sacrifice of $70 per person (1 percent of income) today would be justified only if it increased
the income of our great-grandchildren in 2100 by at least $1,000. If this trade-off appears
reasonable, then a value of eta = 1 is appropriate. If the future payoff required is higher (or
lower) then so is the preferred value of eta.").
41. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 706.
42. Id. at 708. Weitzman rightly notes that this "no frills stripped-down variant of the
Ramsey model.. .is liable to a thousand and one legitimate questions and criticisms about its
oversimplifications, but at the end of the day.. .this exercise is highlighting fairly what really
counts in the economics of climate change." Id. For a clear and accessible discussion of
alternative models for discounting and the various issues they raise, see also Mark A. Moore
et al.,
Just Give Me a Number! PracticalValues for the Social Discount Rate, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 789 (2004).
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high as 20 percent, "forever." 43 As noted earlier, estimated damages would
be only one one-hundredth as large with different parameter values
yielding r = 6 percent. This is not to say, however, that the Stern Review's
parameter values were "wrong" or that its damage estimate is "too high."
As the article later discusses, such conclusions involve ethical value
judgments, which are inherently contestable.
3. Assessing the Costs and Benefits of CarbonMitigation/ClimateStabilization
Next, the Stern Review authors assess the economics of mitigation/
stabilization. In accordance with IPCC TAR and more recent data, they find
that stabilizing GHG concentrations at levels that would avoid very costly
climate changes will require "deep emissions cuts of at least 25 percent by
2050,"" implying a nominal decline of 30 to 35 GtCO 24. To achieve that
goal, emissions would peak during the next 10 to 20 years and then decline
by between one percent and three percent per year.' The Stern Review
estimates that cutting emissions 25 percent by 2050 would cost
approximately one percent of annual global GDP (about $1 trillion in 2050),
plus or minus three percent, and would stabilize concentration levels at
between 500 to 550 ppm of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2eq)" 7 At
concentration levels in that range, the most harmful effects of climate
change would be averted. Stem calculates that by investing one percent of
annual global GDP starting now and continuing potentially forever, the
world could avert costs to annual global GDP of ten percent "forever."' In
the "worst case," climate change mitigation would yield net costs
amounting to 3.4 percent of annual global GDP. In the "best case," climate
change mitigation would add 3.9 percent net to annual global GDP.49
Finally, the Stern Review considers policy options for mitigating
GHG emissions and recommends a Pigovian carbon tax or tradable
permitting system to establish a price of carbon at or near the social-cost
level.' Although the Stern Review presents a fairly comprehensive and
detailed introduction to various policy options, it does not actually engage
in a comparative BCA (or comparative cost-effectiveness analysis) of

43. STERN, supra note 2, at 186-87.
44. Id. at 191.
45. Id. at 227.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 191, 268.
48. Id. at 320.
49. Id. at 271.
50. Id. at xvii-xviii. A carbon tax would establish an explicit price, while a tradable
permitting system would establish an implicit price by setting quantitative limits on carbon
emissions. See generallyMartin Weitzman, Pricesvs. Quantities,41 REV. ECON. STuD. 477 (1974).
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alternative policies for achieving its goal of climate stabilization at 500 to
550 ppm of CO2eq by 2050.
III. CRITIQUES OF THE STERN REVIEW
Turning now to the critics of the Stern Review, I will focus only on
those criticisms with salience for the theory and practice of regulatory BCA.
This is not the place, and I certainly do not possess the scientific expertise,
to assess or resolve complaints that the Review's authors misinterpreted or
misapplied scientific data.5 I assume that any set of "best practice"
standards for BCA requires the use of the best available information inputs
with due care to avoid errors, 2 and that the Stern group made good-faith
efforts to comply with that requirement.' If good-faith errors of scientific
fact were made, then the authors certainly should correct them in a
supplemental BCA. I further assume that any discrepancies between the
science basis of the Stern Review and the IPCC's FourthAssessment Report 4
will be resolved in a supplemental BCA, prepared under auspices of HM
Treasury, using the same PAGE2002 IAM or explaining why new data
require a change in the model. Having cabined scientific/factual errors and
subsequent improvements to the knowledge base, we can proceed to
address what is truly significant in the Stern Review for the theory and
practice of regulatory BCA.
Relevant critiques of the Stern Review focus on its damage estimates
and parameter valuations, including the pure rate of time preference (p),
the value of (q), and the rate of growth in per capita consumption (g).

51.

See, e.g., Robert M. Carter et al., The Stern Review: A Dual Critique: PartI: The Science,

7 WORLD ECON. 167 (2006), available at http://meteo.lcd.lu/globalwarming/Carter/WESTERN.pdf.
52. It is, perhaps, the first "best practice" standard of regulatory BCA to exercise due care
in avoiding the problem of "garbage in, garbage out."
53. Yohe & Tol, supra note 5, at 39, allege that the Stern Review "subjected academic
standards to political goals." Similarly, Nordhaus, supra note 5, at 688, suggests that "the
Review should be read primarily as a document [that] is political in nature and has advocacy
as its purpose." Such statements fall short, however, of alleging deliberate manipulation of
inputs or procedures. Neither Nordhaus nor Yohe and Tol provide any evidence of deliberate
manipulation. The use of a low pure rate of time preference is not necessarily evidence that the
Stern Review authors were massaging the numbers to yield an outcome they preferred. Even
if we disagree with p = 0.1 percent, the Stern Review sets forth legitimate reasons (aside from

instrumental political values) to support that value.
54.

INTERGOVERNMENTALPANELONCLIMATECHANGE, FOURTHASSESSMENTREPORT (2007)

[hereinafter IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT].
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A. Problems with the Stern Review's Damage Estimates
Yohe and Tol provide several "reasons for concern" about the Stern
Review's damage estimates, including the fact that they exceeded other
studies' damage estimates by three standard deviations. 55 In part, this is a
function of Stem's assumption of more pessimistic scenarios. Mendelsohn
also points out that Stem assumed large nonmarket damages, without
supporting evidence.56 Sterner and Persson, by contrast, argue that the Stern
Review's PAGE2002 IAM and all other climate change IAMs systematically
underestimate nonmarket damages.17 Most problematically, Stem did not
specify assumed valuations for human lives and other nonmarket goods,
rendering the Review's damage estimations impossible to assess or replicate.
This omission must violate any conceivable set of "best practice" standards
for BCA.
B. Is p

=

0.1% Too Low?

The single most controversial aspect of the Stern Review
undoubtedly has been the choice of 0.1 percent as the pure rate of time
preference (p). The reason, of course, is that this choice significantly affects
the overall outcome of the BCA. As noted earlier, the Stern Review's
unusually low p, when combined with an unusually low coefficient of
relative risk aversion (r7= 1), yields an unusually low interest rate (r = 1.4%)
for discounting future consumption, which magnifies future damages by
two orders of magnitude over a more traditional six-percent interest rate for
discounting future consumption." As Yohe and Tol observe,
Moving from a discount rate of 0.1 percent to 1 percent would
lower damage estimates by nearly 60 percent; moving to 2
percent by roughly another 20 percent, and moving to 3
percent by another 15 percent. As a result, damages
calculated from the same underlying data with a 3 percent

55. Yohe & Tol, supra note 5, at 40, tbl. 1. Statisticians use the concept of "standard
deviation" to describe the extent to which data points in a probability distribution are
dispersed around the mean. In other words, it is a measure of variance. A higher standard
deviation (e.g., three instead of one) implies a greater variance from the mean.
56. Mendelsohn et al., supra note 5, at 44. It is worth noting that Mendelsohn's own
models of climate change exclude nonmarket damages altogether.
57. Sterner & Persson, supra note 6. However, Sterner and Persson assume that climate
impacts have a positive income elasticity, whereas studies show that poorer people tend to be
more vulnerable to climate change effects. See, e.g., Robert Mendelsohn et al., The Distributional
Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor Countries, 11 ENV'T & DEv. ECON. 159 (2006). I am
grateful to Richard Tol for pointing out this aspect of Sterner and Persson's analysis.
58. This is not to endorse six percent as an appropriate value of r but merely to
demonstrate the sensitivity of damage estimates to the consumption discount rate.
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discount rate would produce damage estimates between 10
and 20 percent of the estimates reported in the Review. 9
Compared to other studies, the Stern Review's discount rate is
indeed very low, and its estimate of damages correspondingly high. Tol
analyzed 28 published studies that provided 103 total estimates of the
marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions.6 The utility discount
rates in those 28 studies generally ranged between one and three percent
(with some cases of hyperbolic discounting). Tol's comparison found that
the utility discount rate/pure rate of time preference starkly influences both
the central estimate and the uncertainty:
If we use a pure rate of time preference of 3 percent
-corresponding to a social rate of discount of 4-5 percent,
close to what most western governments use for most longterm investments- the combined mean estimate is $16/tC
(ton of carbon), not exceeding $62/tC with a probability of 95
percent. Lower social rates of discount lead to higher
estimates but particularly to greater uncertainty, but even for
a 1 percent pure rate of time preference the combined mean
is $51/tC. Even lower discount rates may be morally
preferable, but are clearly out of line with common practice.61
That last sentence is intriguing. If lower discount rates are "morally
preferable" but "out of line with common practice," as Tol suggests they
might be, which should be adjusted, the "morally preferable" discount rate
or the "common practice"? As we shall see later, Weitzman presents a
strong ethical argument that the discount rate should be made to comport
to convention.62 But Weitzman also notes that structural uncertainties in
climate change damage estimates might justify the selection of a very low
discount rate (although he would prefer to deal with such structural
uncertainties via the damage function, rather than the discount rate).'
The Stern Review's estimate of $85/tCO2eq under BAU exceeded by
more than a factor of five Tol's combined mean estimate from 28 previous
studies.' No wonder the Stern Review calls for quicker and steeper
reductions in GHG emissions than any previous BCA. This is not to say,

59. Yohe & Tol, supra note 5, at 39-40.
60. Richard S.J. Tol, The MarginalDamage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Assessment
of the Uncertainties,33 ENERGY POL'Y 2064 (2005).
61. Id. at 2073.
62. Weitzman, supra note 1.
63. See. id. at 713-14.
64. Compare Stern supranote 2, at 322, and Tol, supra note 60. The term "tCO2eq" stands
for ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. It represents a means by which emissions of various
greenhouse gases, which have differential effects, can be commonly evaluated.
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however, that the Stern Review's cost-estimate is necessarily wrong. Tol
concedes that
[tihe current generation of aggregate estimates may understate the true cost of climate change because they tend to
ignore extreme weather events; exclude low probability/ high
consequence scenarios, such as a shut-down of the thermohaline circulation.. .or a collapse of the West-Antarctic ice
sheet...; underestimate the compounding effect of multiple
stresses; and ignore the costs of transition and learning.'
Each of the factors missing from the earlier generation of aggregate
estimates is present and accounted for in the Stern Review. That must justify
a higher cost-estimate. How much higher? Tol does not tell us, but
concludes that the Stern Review "overestimates the impacts of climate
change, and therefore the benefits of emission reduction."'
William Nordhaus agrees withTol's assessment and concludes that
the Stern Review's choice of a very low p, more than any other factor,
explains why the Stern Review's results differ so dramatically from those of
other climate change BCAs, including his own:67
The Review proposes ethical assumptions that produce very
low discount rates. Combined with other assumptions, this
magnifies impacts in the distant future and rationalizes deep
cuts in emissions, and indeed in all consumption, today. If we
substitute more conventional discount rates used in other

65. Tol, supra note 60, at 2067.
66. Tol, supra note 5, at 979. In the popular media, Tol was even more damning of the
Stem Review"s conclusions:
"If a student of mine were to hand in this report as a Master's thesis, perhaps
if I were in a good mood I would give him a 'I' for diligence; but more likely
I would give him an 'F' for fail... .There is a whole range of very basic
economics mistakes that somebody who claims to be a Professor of
Economics simply should not make."
Quoted in Simon Cox & Richard Vadon, Running the Rule over Stern's Numbers, BBCNews, Jan.
26, 2007, availableat http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ newsbbc.couk/
2/hi/science/nature/6295021.stm. Most recently, Tol, along with Gary Yohe and Dean
Murphy, has taken a more generous approach to the Stem Review. After noting that "unusually
harsh words have been said about the Stem Review" (including by both Tol and Yohe), they
concede that "the Review may be right," albeit "for the wrong reasons." Gary Yohe et al., On
Setting Near-term Climate Policy While the Dust Begins to Settle: The Legacy of the Stern Review,
18 ENERGY & ENVT 621 (2007). Instead of berating Stem for shoddy economics, they treat the
disagreements over discount rates, damage functions, etc. as technical details, which, while
controversial among economists, should not deter policy makers from taking immediate
action. Id. at 624.
67. Nordhaus, supra note 5.
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global-warming analyses by governments, by consumers, or
by businesses, the Review's dramatic results disappear.... 6
Nordhaus is right that the Stern Review's damage estimates would
be significantly lower under higher discount rates, but that does not
necessarily imply that the discount rate alone drives the Review's
conclusions and recommendations. Using Stem's damage estimates,
Kenneth Arrow finds that the Review's "fundamental conclusion is justified
one heavily discounts the future."69 In fact, Arrow calculates that
...
even if...
present mitigation of GHG emissions is better than BAU "for any social rate
of time preference (p)less than 8.5 percent," a rate higher than any analyst
recommends." Arrow concludes that "the case for intervention to keep CO 2
levels within bounds (say, aiming to stabilize them at about 550 ppm) is
sufficiently strong as to be insensitive to the arguments about p."
Even if Nordhaus were right that Stem's unusually low utility
discount rate completely determined the outcome of the economic analysis,
it is important to recognize that Nordhaus, himself, has a dog in this hunt.
He has been conducting economic analyses of climate change for more than
three decades. In recent years, his analyses have utilized a 3-percent
discount rate, declining to one percent per year over 300 years.' The Stern
Review expressly argues that Nordhaus's studies using the DICE JAM (and
other analysts' studies using different IAMs) have systematically
underestimated the costs of climate change under a BAU scenario.73 By
attacking the Stern Review's relatively low parameter values, Nordhaus is
defending his own choices, which admittedly are more consistent with the
rest of the literature (much of which has, of course, been influenced by
Nordhaus's studies).74
But why did the Stern Review authors choose such a low utility
discount rate in the first place? Was their intent simply to manipulate cost

at 689.
68. Id.
69. Arrow, supra note 6,at 1.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Nordhaus's newly minted DICE-2007 model uses a constant pure rate of time
preference of 1.5 percent. For a more extensive description of DICE-2007, see infra note 142.
73. STERN, supra note 2, at 170-73. Other critics have made similar arguments about
Nordhaus's model. See, e.g., William Cline, Meeting the Challengeof Global Warming, in GLOBAL
CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (Bjom Lomborg ed., 2004); Frank Ackerman & Ian Finlayson, The
Economics of Inaction on Climate Change: A Critique (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/9/F/climatechange-htfts_2.pdf); Quiggin,
supra note 6.
74. In an e-mail message sent to Sir Nicholas Stern, Nordhaus reportedly stated that the
Review is"a great study, but it is 50 years ahead of its time... Since everybody else is 50 years
behind the times, if you average the two, you might come out just right." David Leonhardt,
Amid the Ivy, A Battle About the Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at C1.
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estimates so as to justify more rapid and extreme measures to control GHG
emissions? The Stern Review is replete with expressions of concern that
earlier studies had underestimated the costs of climate change, but the
authors do not attempt to justify the choice of a low discount rate based on
that concern alone. Rather, they follow the lead of several other prominent
economists such as Frank Ramsey, Amartya Sen, and Robert Solow in
presenting affirmative and legitimate ethicalreasonsagainst anything higher
than a minimal discount rate for estimating the costs of climate change. 75
Ramsey famously argued that discounting is "ethically indefensible and
arises merely from the weakness of the imagination."76 The late David
Pearce argued that discounting is a "brute fact" because people are observed
to discount for time and space in making individual investment/
consumption decisions.7 But just because people are observed to do it does
not make it right. Ramsey's point is that both the decision to discount and
the choice of a social discount rate are not just matters of positive economics
but normative ethics. 78 Stern agrees with Ramsey that people should not
discount for time and space. Indeed, the only reason the Stern Review uses
a 0.1 percent pure rate of time preference, rather than a zero rate, is the risk
of human extinction during the course of the current century.79
The bottom-line question for present purposes is whether the Stern
Review's pure rate of time preference is so low as to violate some presumed
"best practice" standard. As a matter of theory and practice, this is a
difficult question to answer. The choice of a social discount rate is
inherently subjective and as Portney and Weyant have observed, "Those
looking for guidance on the choice of discount rate could find justification
[in the literature] for a rate at or near zero, as high as 20 percent, and any
and all values in between. " s Thus, the Stem Review's choice of a discount
rate close to zero does not seem invalid per se. That it deviates from the
literature does not make it wrong, only deviant. We might conclude that

75. STERN, supra note 2, at 35-36.
76. Frank Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928). What Ramsey
refers to as a "failure of imagination," Arrow et al. refer to as "impatience or myopia." Kenneth
J. Arrow et al., IntertemporalEquity and Discounting,in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC
AND Poucy IssuEs 5 (M. Munasinghe ed., World Bank Environment Paper No. 12,1995).
77. David Pearce et al., Valuing the Future:Recent Advances in Social Discounting,4 WORLD
ECON. 121,122 (2003).
78. For a more extensive discussion of economic and philosophical arguments against
discounting and their potential role in determining "best practices" for BCA, see Cole, supra
note 8, at 30-31.
79. STERN, supra note 2, at 45. On the significance of the probability of human extinction
for the choice of the social rate of discount, see Menachem E. Yarri, A Law of Large Numbers in
the Theory of Consumer's Choice Under Uncertainty, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 202 (1976).
80. DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1,4 (Paul R.Portnoy &John P. Weyant

eds., 1999).
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deviance from an accepted norm would violate a duty of BCA producers
not to impose their own values paternalistically on society. 81 But it is not at
all clear that such a norm (yet) exists.82 However, as we shall see in section
III.C, there is a counter-argument to Stem's ethical claims about the
discount rate.

C. Is Y7= 1 Too Low?
One prominent critic of the Stern Review, Partha Dasgupta, has no
complaint with the choice of 0.1 percent for the pure rate of time
preference;' he has previously suggested that the discount rate for climate
change might be zero or even negative if costs are severe enough to require
reductions in consumption." Moreover, Dasgupta notes that there is
precedent for Stem's choice of a low pure rate of time preference in William
Cline's economic analysis of global warming,' which set p at zero.'
However, Dasgupta is highly critical of the Stern Review's choice of
r (the elasticity of marginal utility or coefficient of relative risk aversion).
"To assume that [rY] equals 1 is to say that the distribution of well-being
among people doesn't matter much, that we should spend huge amounts
for later generations even if, adjusting for risk, they were expected to be
much better off than us." 87 A high qwould "imply greater sensitivity to risk
and inequality in consumption."8

81. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 709, 720 (making a similar point).
82. See Cole, supra note 8, at 27-32. Matthew Adler argues that "the presumption against
paternalism that informs much economic writing should be no part of CBA [cost-benefit
analysis]. CBA should neutrally assess the costs and benefits of paternalism, recognizing that
paternalistic measures (like all government measures) have costs, but these costs might be
outweighed by the benefits." Matthew Adler, Cost-benefit Analysis: New Foundations,
LEGIsLAC;Ao 42-43 (2006). See also MATrHEW D. ADLER & ERic A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006). Even assuming Adler is right about paternalism in BCA,
however, it is not obviously the place of the economists who prepare economic analyses to
impose their own subjective values in the process. We will return to this issue in the following
section.
83. See Dasgupta, supra note 5.
84. Partha Dasgupta et a, Intergenerational Equity, Social Discount Rates, and Global
Warming, in DIscOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQurrY, supra note 80, at 51.
85. See CLINE, supra note 3. In fact, Cline adopted parameter values, all of which were very
close to those chosen by Stem. In Cline, p = 0%, r7= 1.5, and g = 1%, which in the Ramsey
model yields r = 1.5%, a mere one-tenth of one percent above the Stern Review's value for r.
Weitzman, supra note 1, at 712, notes that Cline, like Stern, reached "strong activist
conclusions."
86. Dasgupta, supra note 5, at 5.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. In addition to his critique of the Stern Review's choice of r7, Dasgupta, id. at 6-7,
makes an important observation about the public choice implications of the Review's
conclusion that the world should spend one percent of global GDP annually to combat climate
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To give a feel for how changing the q alters consequences,
Dasgupta provides the following example. If the rate of return on
investment is four percent per annum, then under the Stern Review's
assumptions of p = 0.1 and q = 1 the social saving rate ought to be 97.5
percent, which is so out of line with social practice as to be ridiculous. If,
however, we altered the Stern Review's assumptions so that requaled three,
the optimum saving rate would fall to a more reasonable (at least for
wealthy countries) savings rate of 25 percent of net aggregate output.
Dasgupta notes that the Stern Review contains no sensitivity analysis for its
set of assumptions about the values of p. r,and g.89 From the perspective
of "best practices" for BCA, this is probably his most significant complaint.
John Quiggin takes issue with Dasgupta's argument about the Stern
Review's valuation of ? based on a presumed four-percent market rate of
return on investment. According to Quiggin, "the fact that we see more
rapid growth with lower rates of net saving seems to imply that there must
exist many projects with rates of return greater than or equal to 4 percent."
In addition, "[iun an economy where most growth in consumption arises

change. He reasonably assumes that all of the spending would come from the world's
developed countries, and that one percent of global GDP would equal 1.8 percent of developed
countries' GDP. But, he notes, that figure would be "some seven times the annual global aid
budget." Implicit is the assumption that spending to mitigate global climate change constitutes
foreign aid. Id. This assumption is strongly supported by Tom Schelling's assessment of climate
change as a political-economic issue. According to Schelling, supra note 36, spending to
counteract climate change constitutes foreign aid because the primary (if not exclusive)
"investors" would be developed countries, while the primary (though not exclusive)
beneficiaries would be developing countries, which are expected to bear the brunt of climate
change costs. See also Schelling, supra note 36, at 34-35. POSNER, supra note 12, at 125-26, 256,
generally concurs in this assessment but suggests that spending to prevent abrupt climate
change catastrophes would not constitute foreign aid because such catastrophes would impose
huge costs on the developed world as well as the developing world.
To the extent that climate change investments would constitute foreign aid, a key
question becomes how to persuade voting publics in developed countries "to instruct their
governments, collectively," to increase foreign aid spending so dramatically in accordance with
the recommendations of the Stern Review. Dasgupta, supra note 5, at 7. Dasgupta suggests that
simply stating it as a moral imperative is unlikely to be effective. But, of course, the Stern
Review does not simply make a moral argument about the need for more spending to minimize
the social costs of climate change; its argument is first and foremost economic. If spending
more now can reduce costs down the road (after those costs are discounted to present value),
then the choice is a matter of both economic efficiency and ethics. Whether or not developed
countries would internalize enough of those efficiency gains to make the additional investment
in foreign aid worthwhile remains questionable. And so the public choice issue remains. But
the same issues would remain with respect to any recommendation to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions. Meanwhile, the possibility of climate change catastrophes, referred to by Posner,
should reduce political opposition to mitigation investments. As such, spending would not
amount to foreign aid.
89. Dasgupta, supra note 5, at 6.
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from technical progress, the optimal rate of saving is far lower than that
derived by Dasgupta." Finally,
[a] more direct way of refuting Dasgupta's argument is to
observe that the major premise must be false. If there existed
an infinite supply of projects with riskless returns of 4 per
cent, the rate of return on riskless bonds would have to equal
4 percent, rather than the 1 to 2 percent observed in practice.90
Whether or not we agree with Dasgupta that the Stern Review's q
is too low, he has performed a valuable service in focusing attention on a
relatively neglected element in the composition of r (the discount rate of
consumption). The Y7actually combines three distinct valuations within a
single number: (1) a measure of risk aversion, (2) a judgment about the
extent of static income inequality among different people, and (3) a
judgment about the extent of dynamic income inequality for individuals
over time. The inferences we make about each one of these judgments
affects the valuations of the others and the overall valuation of .9'
According to Weitzman's interpretation, the authors of the Stern Review
seem to want a low q for some purposes, but a higher ? for others. 2
Utilizing inconsistent values of r7would seem to violate best practices in
BCA, but the temptation to assign inconsistent values to 17 is understandable given the variety of potentially inconsistent judgments that i incorporates.
Finally, arguing that the Stern Review's value of q is either too high
or too low seems myopic because the rqis only one element in the Ramsey
equation's formula for determining the social rate of discount. A low or
high value of q does not by itself tell us anything about the values of future
costs and benefits of climate change and GHG mitigation. As Sterner and
Persson note, "A higher value of q implies less greenhouse gas abatement
today unless we will not be richer but poorer in the future: then the logic
implies that a higher q7gives higher damage values, and more abatement
would be warranted."' To see how a higher value of q7could result in a
policy of more present investment in abatement of GHG emissions, assume
that p = 3, g = -1, and q = 3. Plugging those elements into the Ramsey
equation yields r = 0. While some economists might scoff at the notion of a
negative rate of growth in consumption, we shall see shortly that climate

90. Quiggin, supra note 6, at 15.
91. I am grateful to Marty Weitzman for his assistance in unpacking these discrete aspects
of the Y7
and the complications that can (but do not necessarily) arise from their combination
into a single numeric value.
92. Weitzman, supra note 1.
93. Sterner & Persson, supra note 6, at 6.
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models forecast a low but positive probability of extreme changes that
could result in what Weitzman calls "low-g disasters.""
D. It's the r, Stupid!
As a practical matter, neither the choice of p (pure rate of time
preference) nor r (coefficient of the relative rate of risk aversion), alone, is
critical. Rather, it is the combination of those factors along with g (the
assumed growth rate of per capita consumption) in the Ramsey equation
that determine r (the interest rate at which future consumption is
discounted).95 As noted above, the Stern Review selects the following values:
p = 0.1%, r= 1, and g = 1.3% to yield r = 1.4%. Weitzman agrees with
Nordhaus and Tol that "[t]he discount rate we choose is all important and
Stem's results come from choosing a very low discount rate... ."' But
whereas Nordhaus and Tol focused on the p,Weitzman more appropriately
focuses on the r. He notes that if p = 2%, q= 2, and g = 2%, then r = 6%. If
we assume instead that p = 0%, 17= 3, and g = 2%, then r is still = 6%. Thus,
we can derive the same consumption discount rate, whether p equals two
percent or zero percent, by adjusting the q and/or g.97 Likewise, the same
social discount rate can be attained regardless of the value of rqby adjusting
the p or the g.
The Stern Review's valuation of r = 1.4% is comparatively low
because p = 0.1% and the value chosen for the coefficient of the relative rate
of risk aversion, 7 = 1, is "the lowest lower bound of just about any
economist's best-guess range."" Weitzman points out that under an
alternative r = 6 (which Weitzman does not necessarily recommend as
correct or preferable), the Stern Review's present discounted value of
damages from climate change over the next 100 years would be lower by
two orders of magnitude. And so, "what really counts in the economics of
climate change [is] the hidden discounting assumptions whose role tends
to be more obscured than informed by the big IAMs." 99 This is not just a

94. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 717.
95. See STERN, supra note 2, at 52-54; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 707.
96. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 704. He does not argue, however, that Stem was wrong to
adopt such a low pure rate of time preference but only notes that "Stern follows a decidedlyminority paternalistic view (which, however, includes a handful of distinguished economists)."
Id. at 707.
97. Id. at 707.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 708. It is not at all clear why Weitzman believes that the discounting assumptions
in Stem or other models have been "hidden." They are debatable to be sure, and they may
drive the outcomes of the Stem Review and every other economic analysis of climate change.
However, Stem is certainly explicit about the choice of discounting assumptions and provides
explicit arguments in support of its assumptions. Id.
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criticism of the Stern Review and its choice of parameter values but a
challenge to the entire practice of economic analysis of climate change. It
has special relevance for the Stern Review, however, simply because the
Review's authors assumed parameter values that ignored how people are
observed to act. As Weitzman puts it,
Stem's worldview tends to blow off market-based
observations and behavioral inferences as being (for a variety
of reasons including market incompleteness) largely
irrelevant to long-run discounting, which should instead be
based primarily upon the "ethical" value 6 -0 that Stern
imposes on a priori grounds ....
While there may be something
to Stem's position about the limited relevance of marketbased inferences for putting welfare weights on the utilities
of one's great-grandchildren, and there might be some
sporadic support for Stem's preferred taste parameters
scattered throughout the literature, I ultimately find such an
extreme stance on the primacy of 6 =0, q7 = 1 unconvincing
when super-strong policy advice is so dependent upon nonconventional assumptions that go so strongly against
mainstream economics. 100
In essence, Weitzman's argument is about the values of convention and
prudence in BCA. In his view, analysts should not rest strong and socially
costly policy recommendations on conclusions resulting from unconventional assumptions that run counter to observed economic behavior.0 1
In addition, Weitzman seems to be making an important point about the

100. Id. at 709. Later in his review, however, Weitzman shows that observed economic
behavior creates problems not just for Stem's choice of parameter values but "threatens all
such formulations." Id. at 714.
101. Id. at 704-05. However, as Newell and Pizer point out, "there are few if any observable
market rates for investment horizons more than 30 years in the future, making the interest rate
beyond those horizons even more uncertain than it otherwise might be." RICHARD NEWELL &
WILLIAM PIZER, DISCOUNTING THE BENEFITS OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: How MUCH Do
UNCERTAIN RATES INCREASE VALUATIONS? 13 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2001),
availableat http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-RT-disbenefits.pdf. Given the lack of
"observable market rates" for investments with longer time horizons and the likelihood that
uncertainty over future interest rates militates in favor of lower discount rates, to what extent
can the Stern Review really be faulted for ignoring "observed economic behavior" in selecting
a value of p? Weitzman, supra note 1, at 714. Even if we could observe market rates for
investments with very long time horizons, Sterner & Persson, supra note 6, at 5, argue that
"using an observable real market variable as a benchmark is not appropriate because we are
searching for a number on which to base ethical or normative judgments. We are not simply
observing the market as we do in positive or empirical studies; rather, we are providing
arguments for public action that involves the provision of very complex public goods."
Quoting Hume, they go on to note that "one cannot derive an ought from an is." Id. at 6.
Obviously, Sterner and Persson have a different view than Weitzman of the role of BCA.
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role of economic analysts: their job is not to impose their own values and
preferences on society but to input the best available data in a responsible
fashion and analyze that data using models based on prudent assumptions
that are broadly consistent with the way people are actually observed to
behave. Then, they can present the results to policy makers, whose job it is
to make decisions that either comport with or "go so strongly against
mainstream economics." 10 2 If I am interpreting him correctly, Weitzman is
making a strong ethical argument about the propriety of social discounting
and, more generally, about how BCAs should and should not be done.
E. Or, Is It the g (Specifically, "Low-g" Catastrophes)?
Although Weitzman strongly criticizes the Stern Review for its
assumptions and analytical weaknesses, he is not as quick as other
reviewers to denounce its conclusions or policy recommendations. To the
contrary, he suggests that the Stern Review's value of r "may end up being
more right than wrong when full accounting is made for the uncertainty of
the discount rate itself, which arguably is the most important uncertainty
of all in the economics of climate change" 10 3 Why?
The very same force of compound interest that makes costs
and benefits a century from now seem relatively insignificant,
and that additionally creates the "majority tilt" of a painpostponing climate policy ramp of emissions reductions
starting from a low gradual base [as in Nordhaus's model],
also forces us to recognize the logic that over such long
periods we should be using interest rates at the lower end of
the spectrum of possible values.'
Specifically, Weitzman suggests that uncertainty over which discount rates
to use for the costs and benefits of climate change a century from now
might reduce the value of r from six percent to0 5as low as two percent, which
is not far above the Stern Review's value of r.1
Because Weitzman does not agree with the Stern Review's use of the
discount rate to deal with the problem of possible extreme climate events
("low-g catastrophes"), he develops a new model that factors structural
uncertainty into the Ramsey equation. I will not reproduce his formal model

102. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 709. The roles of analyst and policy maker are somewhat
obscured in the Stern Review because, in his position as second permanent secretary of HM
Treasury, Sir Nicholas Stem was not just an analyst but a policy maker as well.
103. Id. at 710. See also Arrow et al., supra note 76, at 5, n.6 (noting that the issue of how to
deal with uncertainty in forecasting is "[n]ot yet resolved").
104. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 710.
105. Id. at 723.
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here, but his argument boils down to this: the comparatively low parameter
values assumed by Stern. 6 and Cline"° may well be justified because the
damages of climate change over the next century might not coordinate well
with aggregate economic activity. The economic sectors most likely to be
harmed by climate change, such as agricultural, outdoor recreation, and
natural landscapes (including nonmarket ecosystem values) are not "highly
correlated with technological progress in computer power, furniture
making, or better pharmaceuticals a century from now."" ° This presents a
big problem for those who favor basing the discount rate on the economywide return on capital. The other option is to base the discount rate on the
risk-free rate of return, which "is close to the Stern interest rate."1°9
The "moral" drawn by Weitzman "is that the nature of the impacts
of climate change determine[s] whether we should end up closer to using
the risk-free rate or the economy-wide return on capital." But "trying to
forecast costs and benefits of climate change scenarios a hundred years or
so from now is more the art of inspired guesstimating by analogy than a
science (imagine forecasting today's world a century ago)." 10 Is Weitzman
suggesting that "state of the art" economic analysis is not yet up to the task
of dealing with a problem as potentially large and long-term as climate
change? The last three sections of Weitzman's review of the Stern Review
suggest that the answer to this question is a qualified yes.
The problem, in a nutshell, is the wide range of possible
temperature increases under the IPCC's most current climate change
models,"' including a five-percent possibility that temperature increases
will equal or exceed 6°C and a two-percent probability of increases equal to
or greater than 8°C within the next 100 to 200 years."2 Weitzman notes that
"any honest economic modeler would have to admit" to complete
uncertainty about the social, economic, and environmental effects of such
a temperature increase because "such high temperatures have not existed
for some tens of millions of years."" 3 Even if their probability is low, high
temperature increases and their climatic consequences, the kind of worsecase scenarios that the Stern Review emphasized, could result in what
Weitzman calls "low-g disasters" (especially if g is defined, as Weitzman
defines it, to include the existence value of ecosystems).114 The possibility of

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

STERN, supra note 2.

CLINE, supra note 3.
Weitzman, supra note 1, at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715. Schelling, supra note 36, at 33-34 (making a similar point).
See PCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 54.
Weitzman, supra note 9, at 2.
Weitzman, supra note 1, at 716.
Id. at 717.
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such disasters makes prediction "uncertain" in the Knightian sense of the
term. 115 As Weitzman explains, "With an evolutionary stochastic process
like global climate change, the world is not standing still long enough for
us to accumulate the relevant information to accurately assess tail
probabilities."" 6 We don't even know how much we don't know about the
probabilities. The structural uncertainties, Weitzman notes, are highly likely
to matter more than the risk for "whomever wants to model optimalexpected-utility growth under endogenous greenhouse warming."
Weitzman commends the Stem Review for treating seriously the
possibility of rare, high-temperature, "low-g" catastrophes, but thinks that
Stern should have dealt with such catastrophes forthrightly rather than
"through the back door" with unreasonably low values of p and 1.7
Presumably, this means that damage estimates should be increased or the
value of g should be lowered based on some admittedly error-prone
calculation of the anticipated effects of high-temperature changes on
consumption levels. But Weitzman also doubts the ability of Stem or any
other economic analyst to perform such calculations given the current state
of economic science. And like other reviewers, he faults the Stem Review
"for giving readers an authoritative-looking impression that seemingly
objective best-available-practice professional economic analysis robustly
supports it conclusions.... ,"8 Weitzman suggests that the Review should
have instead "more openly disclos[ed] the full extent to which the Review's
radical policy recommendations depend on controversial extreme
assumptions and unconventional discount rates that most mainstream
economists would consider much too low."" 9
Finally, Weitzman urges caution in approaching these kinds of
problems in economic analyses: "A responsible policy approach neither
dismisses the horror stories just because they are two standard deviations
away from what is likely nor gets stampeded into overemphasizing false
dichotomies as if we must make costly all-or-nothing investment decisions
right now to avoid theoretically possible horrible outcomes in the distant
future." 2 ' Thus, he recommends a "middle course" that rejects the Stern

115.

See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFrr (1921) (distinguishing between

"risks" to which probabilities can be attached and "uncertainties" to which probabilities cannot
be attached).
116. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 717.
117. Id. at 720. This assertion appears to impute bad faith to the Stern Review authors. But,
as noted earlier, they specified ostensibly legitimate reasons for their choices of parameter
values. Moreover, it is not clear why Weitzman considers it illegitimate to account for lowprobability, high-magnitude climate events by adjusting parameter values. Id.
118. Id. at 724.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 722.
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Review's call for an "all-out war" on GHG emissions, but combines
Nordhaus's gradual implementation of increasingly stringent GHG
emission reductions with more serious research into low-probability, highmagnitude ("low-g") events "and what might be done realistically about
them should they start to materialize."' 2' For now, we simply "lack a
commonly accepted usable economic framework for dealing with these
kinds of thick-tailed extreme disasters, whose probability distributions are
inherently difficult to estimate (which is why the tails must be thick in the
first place).""
Weitzman's conclusion and policy recommendations seem somewhat at odds with his recognition of potential climate-change catastrophes.
All else being equal, intuition suggests that serious consideration of lowprobability, high-magnitude events would lead to recommendations that
favor more rapid and aggressive action to stabilize the climate, as Stern
recommends.' However, Weitzman's thinking on this question is evolving.
In a more recent working paper he finds that structural uncertainties
inherent in our economic analyses of climate change might call for the
application of a "generalized precautionary principle" 24 to avoid
catastrophes that might "drive all of planetary welfare to disastrously low
levels in the most extreme scenarios""' (located in the bad, fat tail of the
probability distribution function). Therefore, a "CBA of fat-tailed potential
catastrophes is inclined to favor paying a lot more attention to learning now
how fat the bad tail might be and - if the tail is discovered to be too heavy
for comfort after the learning process - is a lot more prone to investing bigbudget real money on mitigation measures to slim it down." 26 Economic
analyses that "ignore or suppress the significance of rare tail disasters...
ignore or suppress what economic-statistical decision theory is telling us
here loudly and clearly is potentially the most important part of the
analysis."' 27
Sterner and Persson share Weitzman's concern about the bad fat tail
of probability density functions for climate change damages, but they think

121. Id.
122. Id. at 723.
123. Posner seems to agree, recommending emissions limits now as an "insurance policy"
against the "possibility of abrupt warming." POSNER, supra note 12, at 163. But Posner also
notes that emissions limitations, in the form of taxes, need not be terrifically high to have the
desirable effect of inducing technological advancement and substitution, which he considers
the "only" way to "halt global warming." Id. at 161. Moreover, Posner suggests that "[m]aking
shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable global warming to be
stopped or slowed at some future time at a lower cost." Id. at 162.
124. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 24-26.
125. Id. at 28.
126. Id. at 31.
127. Id. at 23.
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the tail is even fatter and badder than Weitzman realizes because all of the
IAMs, including the Stern Review's PAGE2002 IAM, seriously underestimate
climate change damages. Specifically, they underestimate nonmarket
damages by assuming perfect substitutability for environmental goods that
may be degraded or destroyed as a consequence of climate change." Even
if climate change has relatively little effect on conventional manufacturing
and economic services, it may significantly damage highly valuable
ecosystem services, some of which are "inherently very hard to replace."129
Consequently, to provide an accurate picture of future damages, climate
change IAMs must anticipate changes in the relative prices of environmental goods and services resulting from resource depletion, degradation,
or destruction. Sterner and Persson amend Nordhaus's DICE IAM to show
how "taking relative prices into account can have an effect on necessary
abatement
that is on the same order of magnitude as changing the discount
130
rate."
Contrary to both Weitzman and Sterner and Persson, Tom Schelling
argues that the tails of probability density functions for climate change
damage functions should not drive policy. 131 While he agrees with
Weitzman that "some 'insurance' principle seems to prevail: if there is a
sufficient likelihood of sufficient damage we take some measured
anticipatory action," Schelling argues that we should "[w]eigh the costs, the
benefits, and the probabilities as best all three are known, and don't be
obsessed with either extreme tail of the distribution."' 32 Schelling does not
give much guidance on how to treat the uncertainties associated with lowlikelihood, extreme events such as the collapse of the West Antarctic ice
sheet. He only notes, ambiguously, that immediate action and waiting for
complete certainty before acting are not our only options. 33
F. An Aside: "Safe Minimum Standards" as an Alternative to BCA
Beyond the social discount rate and the factors that comprise it,
concern about structural uncertainties might have broader implications
about whether standard BCA remains the proper tool for making policy
decisions concerning climate change. Structural uncertainties might,
instead, favor the use of a "Safe Minimum Standards" (SMS) approach to

128. Sterner & Persson, supra note 6, at 9.
129. Id. at 14.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Thomas C. Schelling, Climate Change: The Uncertainties,the Certainties,and What They
Imply About Action. 4 ECONOMISTS' VOICE, July 2007, at 4, available at http://www.bepress.
com/ev/vol4/iss3/art3.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 5.
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regulatory decision making. SMS applies a relatively hard precautionary
principle -harder, perhaps, than Weitzman's "generalized precautionary
principle" - by establishing a floor "below which the flow of key ecosystem
services should not be permitted to fall." 1" The floor could be set to avoid
the very kinds of potential discontinuities that complicate efforts to model
climate change using traditional BCA" But just where should the floor be
set? It would seem that the same structural uncertainties that vex
conventional BCA would also create problems for SMS. The only difference
is that SMS utilizes a hard precautionary principle according to which
uncertainty would automatically support greater efforts at mitigation and
stabilization. In other words, it builds in a higher level of risk aversion.
Naturally, economists who prefer not to presume a high level of risk
aversion would oppose the hard precautionary principle of SMS and would
prefer BCA, either with or without Weitzman's presumably softer
"generalized precautionary principle." Obviously, much work remains to
be done to determine the best means of factoring risk aversion - in
particular aversion to potentially catastrophic harms-into economic
analyses.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BCA
What are the implications of the Stern Review and its critics for the
theory and practice of BCA? There are several potential lessons, which are
listed below and only briefly discussed in no particular order of importance.
They are all important.
A. Of Confidence and Caveats
Economic analyses of problems and policies at the frontiers of
scientific knowledge are bound to be controversial and error prone,
especially where time horizons are long and uncertainty looms large. In
some cases, they amount to little more than shots in the dark. This is not an

134. Michael Margolis & Eric Nevdal, Safe Minimum Standards in Dynamic Resource
Problems- Conditionsfor Living at the Edge of Risk 1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper
04-03, 2004).
135.

See S.V. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES, ch.

18 (1952) (SMS and BCA may not be mutually exclusive); see also Bryan G. Norton & Michael
A. Toman, Sustainability:Ecological and Economic Perspectives,73 LAND ECON. 553,561-63 (1997)
(suggesting that SMS can be combined with standard BCA in a "two-tiered" system of policy
analysis); Mohan Munasinghe et al., Applicabilityof Techniques of Cost-Benefit Analysis to Climate
Change, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IssuEs 33 (Mohan Munasinghe

ed., World Bank Environment Paper No. 121995,1995) (suggesting that BCA "is a generic term
that subsumes a wide body of specific techniques"). I am grateful to Ian Hodge for suggesting
the comparison of traditional BCA with SMS.
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argument against making the effort to economically analyze complex
problems like climate change. For such problems all of our approaches to
decision making are likely to be controversial and error-prone, and there is
little reason to suppose that any other approach would provide policy
makers with better quality information than multiple BCAs. Nevertheless,
given the special analytical - particularly measurement - problems of longterm, highly complex problems like climate change, authors of BCAs should
be especially cautious about the conclusions they draw and the recommendations they make. Nearly all reviewers agree that the Stem group
pretended to greater confidence in their comparatively radical conclusions
and recommendations than the facts and analysis warranted. While the
Stern Review contained several warnings about the problems associated with
forecasting the costs and benefits of climate change and mitigation, it did
not heed its own warnings when presenting its conclusions and
recommendations unconditionally.
B. On the Inherently Political Nature of BCAs and the Importance of
Sensitivity Analyses
The Stern Review is a political and ethical document as much as an
economic study. Several reviewers consider this a fault, as if BCAs should
be, or ever could be, neutral. All BCAs are, to one extent or another,
political or ethical documents. Given the inherently subjective elements of
BCA - from the valuations of nonmarket goods (including human lives) to
the choice of value parameters (including discount rates) -and given the
influence of those subjective elements on outcomes, each and every BCA
inevitably is informed by the ethical, political, and/or ideological
predilections of its author(s).1" The range of subjective choice may (or may
not) be bounded by the observed behavior of market actors, but the choices
remain inevitably subjective. A chief virtue of BCA as a decision tool is that
it makes those predilections transparent (at least compared to other decision
tools) because, according to "best practices," authors are supposed to make
their assumptions - including choices of parameter values - explicit.

The authors of the Stem Review did not fully meet the standard of
transparency. To their credit, they specified parameter values, including the
utility discount rate. Even if they chose a rate based on paternalistic ethics
that ignored observed economic behavior, at least they were explicit about
it and provided reasoned arguments to support it. They were not explicit,
however, about their valuations of nonmarket goods, including human
lives. Those valuations, just like the discount rate, are subjective and

136.

Sterner & Persson, supra note 6, at 15-16.

Winter 2008]

THE STERN REVIEW

therefore subject to manipulation for political purposes. For that reason,
BCA authors must state and support them explicitly.
Because of the potential for subjective elements including
parameter values and valuations of nonmarket goods to affect the outcome
of BCAs, the Stern Review certainly should have included a sensitivity
analysis. Sensitivity analyses are helpful in demonstrating the relative
robustness of outcomes across alternative valuations. The failure of the
Stern Review authors to include one in their original BCA was a significant
omission, to say the least. In response to their critics, they eventually did
prepare what Weitzman has called "a halfhearted sensitivity analysis
postscript."' 37 Stern's sensitivity analysis purported to demonstrate the
robustness of the Review's conclusions but succeeded only in demonstrating
their high sensitivity to the choice of parameter values (something that
critiques of the Stern Review already had demonstrated). Arguably, Arrow
provides a more convincing argument for the robustness of the Stern
Review's conclusions than the Review's own sensitivity analysis.' 3'
C. On Discounting
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from the Stern Review and its
critics (at least for those who have not already learned it) is that the choice
of parameter values (including discount rates, coefficients of relative risk
aversion, and per capita consumption growth rates) can decisively influence
the outcome of BCAs. Unfortunately, the Stern Review and its critics also
remind us of just how far away we remain from being able to specify a
consensus "best practice" for selecting parameter values. Many (though by
no means all) reviewers complain that the Stern Review's choice of a 0.1
percent pure rate of time preference is too low. This assessment is
supported by two reasons: (a) such a low discount rate ignores how people
actually behave in markets and (b) it deviates significantly from a "conventional range" of discount rates in the BCA literature. These assertions
are both true, and yet they do not warrant a conclusion that Stem's choice
of discount rate was "wrong" or violated some "best practice" of BCA.
It is obviously true that market participants display implicit
discount rates higher than that adopted by the Stern Review, but that is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for governments to adopt
similarly high discount rates in framing policies to deal with long-run
social-cost problems, particularly where those problems are largely the

137. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 707. For the Stern Review's sensitivity analysis, see also
STERN, supranote 2, at 667.
138. See generally Arrow, supra note 6.
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result of the short time horizons and high discount rates of market actors."'
Moreover, as Stem rightly points out, the choice of a discount rate in
regulatory BCA is not just a question of mimicking the market; it is an
ethical judgment.
But is it the job - or the right - of a BCA author to make ethical or
political judgments that can determine the outcome of the BCA?'" Some
critics of the Stern Review suggest not. They believe that the author of a BCA
should avoid imposing his or her own ethical values on policy makers.
Rather, the author should input the best available data, crunch the numbers
in the most neutral way possible, and present the unvarnished results to
public officials who are responsible for making policy. Otherwise, the
author of the BCA inappropriately usurps the role of policy maker."' This
is a sensible argument but, as suggested above, it is not entirely possible for
any author of any BCA to avoid imposing their values on the BCA in ways
that affect the outcome simply because of the subjective judgments that
each BCA inevitably entails. In other words, every author of every BCA is,
to a greater or lesser extent, a would-be policy maker. This is as true of
Nordhaus and his three-percent utility discount rate as it is of Stem and his
0.1 percent utility discount rate.1 42

139. See Cole, supra note 8, at 6; see also Arrow et al., supra note 76, at 5 (explaining that the
existence of market imperfections and suboptimal tax policy might justify deviation from
observed market rates of interest). From a prescriptive perspective, the fact that a chosen social
discount rate is "glaringly inconsistent with observed behavior" (for example, government
spending on education or research, development assistance by donor countries) should not be
decisive. "gIjust because the government fails to allocate resources in one area on the basis of
ethical considerations is no reason to insist that decisions in other areas be consistent with that
initial decision." Id. at 7.
140. Arrow et al., supranote 76, at 7, address this question directly, noting that analysts fall
into one of two camps: descriptivists, who start from observed market behavior; and prescriptivists, who start from normative ethics. Arrow et al. also describe in detail the different
approaches to establishing the social discount rate but do not assert that one is clearly correct
or necessarily preferable to the other. In fact, the authors treat both approaches as valid and
conclude by finding that, with some refinements, the different approaches could lead to similar
policy recommendations. Id.
141. See supra note 102. Because Stern was a policy maker at HM Treasury, he cannot be
accused of "usurping" that role.
142. William Nordhaus has recently revised his DICE model. William Nordhaus, The
Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental Policy (July 24, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice-mss_072407_
all.pdf. Among the most significant changes in DICE-2007, the pure rate of time preference (p)
is reduced from 3.0 percent to 1.5 percent. Id. at 54. In addition, Nordhaus sets the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption (q7)at 2. Id. Significantly, Nordhaus expressly recognizes
that the same real interest rate would be achieved by combining p = 0.1% (a la the Stern Review)
and ri = 2.9. Id. at 62. Unfortunately, Nordhaus does not specify a value of g (the per-capita
growth rate of consumption), so we cannot directly compare his discount rate of consumption
with that of the Stern Review. Earlier versions of the DICE model assumed values of g declining
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As for the "conventional range" of utility discount rates, it is true
that the Stern Review's choice of a 0.1 percent pure rate of time preference
is lower than the rates chosen in most other BCAs. Does this deviance
render it illegitimate? Standard practices can, and sometimes do, become
norms that govern decisions, potentially including decisions about
parameter values. But Portney and Weyant found no normal social discount
rate for BCA, 4 3 and the literature since then provides no basis for revising
their finding.'" Even if there were a generally accepted range of discount
rates for BCAs, prominent economists have argued that climate change
represents a special case -a long-run phenomenon subject to relatively
great uncertainties, including uncertainty about the discount rate itself,
which could lead to ruinous reductions in the growth rate of per capita
consumption -requiring lower-than-usual discount rates.14
Tom Schelling presents a very different reason for believing that
climate change is a special case.'" In his view, discounting is inappropriate
for assessing the costs and benefits of climate change because those who
bear the costs are not the same people, generally speaking, who will receive
the benefits. The costs of climate change, now and in the future, will fall
disproportionately on people in developing countries, but the costs of
mitigating GHG emissions to stabilize the climate and reduce the costs of
climate change under the Kyoto Protocol or any other reasonably
conceivable program will be borne predominantly by the citizens of
wealthier, developed countries.'47 Thus, efforts to mitigate climate change
are in the nature of a foreign aid program, like the Marshall Plan, NATO,
or disease eradication campaigns in Africa. As such, discounting is
inappropriate. Schelling writes that "[ t ] he alleged inborn preference for
earlier rather than later consumption is exclusively concerned with the

from 2.3 percent in 2000 to 1.1 percent by 2050. Taking the average of these numbers, g = 1.7%,
would yield r = 4.6%, well above the Stern Review's r = 1.4%. Consequently, Nordhaus's
estimates of future damages from climate change and future benefits of GHG mitigation
remain far below those of the Stern Review, despite Nordhaus's halving of p. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Nordhaus still finds the Stern Review's recommendations too costly by far. Id. at 29.
Where Stem recommends spending one percent of global GDP to mitigate GHG emissions,
Nordhaus recommends spending only one-tenth as much (about nine dollars per capita),
which would reduce expected global mean temperature increases by 1.71'C over the next
century. Nordhaus's bottom line policy recommendation remains the same: a slow and gradual
ramping up of GHG emissions reductions. Id. at 36-37.
143. See DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 80, at 1-11.
144. See generally Cole, supra note 8.
supra note 84, at 72.
145. See Weitzman, supra note 1, at 717-19; see also Dasgupta et al.,
146. Schelling, supra note 36.
147. Id. at 34-35.
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consumer's impatience with respect to his or her own consumption." 1" He
goes on to note that
decisions to invest in greenhouse gas-emissions abatement for
the benefit of future generations are not "saving decisions" not decisions about postponing one's own consumption - but
are instead decisions about redistributing income, one's own
income. To invest resources now in reduced greenhouse gas
emissions is to transfer consumption from present-day people
-whoever those people are who are making these sacrifices
-for the benefit of people in the distant future. It is very
much like making sacrifices now for people who are distant
geographically or distant culturally.149
If Schelling is right about this,15° then Stern and Cline were right to adopt
zero (or nearly zero) values of p. This does not mean, however, that
Schelling necessarily would concur in their conclusions or recommendations. In fact, Schelling favors a gradual approach to GHG reductions over
51
time.
A final response to the argument from convention is that the Stem
Review's 0.1 percent pure rate of time preference is not unprecedented
among climate change BCAs. The pioneering economic analysis of Cline
adopted a pure rate of time preference of 0.0 percent.5 2 Taken together, the
ethical arguments of Ramsey (among others),'53 the conceptual arguments
of Schelling,' s Portney and Weyant's evaluations of practice, 5 5 and Cline's
application counsel against a conclusion that there is a "best practice,"
convention, or social norm that the Stern Review violated in adopting a 0.1
percent pure rate of time preference. Even if there were such a norm, its
violation would not, by itself, make much difference to the overall BCA. As

148. Id. at 52. Presumably, the same logic would militate against inter-generational discounting.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Posner explicitly agrees with Schelling that "[flrom the standpoint of the American
public, the Kyoto Protocol would be a foreign-aid program." POSNER, supra note 12, at 126. But
later, Posner implicitly argues that not all investments in climate change should be thought of
as foreign aid because abrupt global warming "could be catastrophic for the wealthy as well
as for the poor countries and cannot be assumed to threaten merely in the distant future." Id.
at 256. But even if investments in climate change prevention do not constitute foreign aid,
Posner asserts that we might choose "to dispense with explicit discounting altogether" because
abrupt climate change could "happen soon enough to make discounting unimportant in
deciding whether we should take steps to avert it." Id.
151. See Schelling, supra note 36.
152. See CUNE, supra note 3, at 249-50.
153. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
154. See generallySchelling, supra note 36.
155. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Weitzman demonstrates,1" it is not the pure rate of time preference (p)
alone that is significant, but the combination of parameter values for p, 17,
and g that together determine r, the consumption rate of discount. The pure
rate of time preference is only one factor of the Ramsey equation. And it is
the product of that equation, r, that ultimately has significance for the BCA.
Nevertheless, three concerns remain about the Stern Review's
discount rate. Those concerns relate to other arguable conventions, social
norms, or "best practices" in BCA. First, in selecting a pure rate of time
preference, the Stern Review summarily ignored HM Treasury's own Green
Book of discount rates." 7 Interestingly, the Green Book's schedule closely
tracks Nordhaus and Boyer's model, with a range of discount rates that
decline from 3.5 percent (for costs and benefits between year zero and year
30) to one percent (for costs and benefits arising after 300 years). Stem
makes only a couple of references to HM Treasury's Green Book" and does
not provide anything like a sufficient explanation as to why the authors
chose to ignore the discount rates mandated by their own Ministry. This
should be deemed a violation of a "best practice" standard according to
which government agencies must follow their own rules, unless they
provide a thorough and transparent explanation justifying deviation. Not
doing so generates at least two problems: (a) it creates the appearance (at
least) that something fishy is going on in the BCA and (b) it unjustifiably
erodes the authority of government policy makers.
Second, in rejecting the schedule of discount rates set forth in HM
Treasury's Green Book, the Stem Review rules out, without discussion, the
use of hyperbolic discounting, which more and more economists believe
should be the norm for assessing policies with long-term effects. An
increasing body of empirical evidence suggests that people discount future
costs and benefits hyperbolically, using higher rates of discount for nearterm costs and benefits than for longer-term costs and benefits. 9 For longterm events like climate change, several economists have concluded that
hyperbolic discounting is more appropriate than discounting at any single
value of r."W A few years ago, Weitzman surveyed more than 2,000 of his
fellow economists about their "professionally considered gut feeling"

156. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
157. HM TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (2003), availableat http://greenbook.treasury.gov.uk/media/3/F/greenbook_260907
.pdf.
158. See STERN, supra note 2.
159. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joel C. Huber, Hyperbolic Discounting of Public Goods (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11935,2006), availableat http://www.nber.org/
papers/w11935; Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferencesfor Life-Saving Programs:How the Public
Discounts Time and Age, 8 J.RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243 (1994).
160. See, e.g., Larry Karp, Global Warming and Hyperbolic Discounting,89 J.PUB. ECON. 261
(2005); Moore et al., supra note 42.
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concerning the appropriate social discount rates for measures to mitigate
climate change. Weitzman aggregated their responses and found support
for a discount rate (r) that declines from four percent (in years one through
five) to one percent (after 75 years) and to zero percent (after 300 years)."6'
As we have seen, William Nordhaus's DICE model for climate change
utilizes hyperbolic discounting. And the PAGE2002 model used by the Stern
Review's authors is compatible with hyperbolic discounting. However, Stem
rules out the possibility of hyperbolic discounting by adopting an extremely
low discount rate even for the nearest-term effects of climate change.
Arguably, the Stern Review should not have rejected hyperbolic discounting
without at least discussing and providing reasons against it. The discussion
could have been quite brief, along the following lines: hyperbolic discounting only makes sense if one is beginning from a relatively high
discount rate for near term effects; given that the Stern Review was
beginning with a very low discount rate, there was no need and little
purpose to be served by reducing that rate over time.
Third and finally, it has become common over the last decade or
more for government agencies, at least in the United States, to prepare
BCAs incorporating multiple calculations using various discount rates.162
This practice has the benefit of presenting policy makers with more
information and a clearer understanding that they have a choice of
parameter values and how that choice affects expected valuations of future
costs and benefits and ultimate outcomes. The Stern Review's authors might
at least have presented alternative calculations using HM Treasury's official

161. Martin Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260, 270 (2001). Even if
hyperbolic discounting is observed in practice, some argue that it is problematic as a matter
of economic theory because it implies time-inconsistent plans. See, e.g., Maureen Cropper &
David Laibson, The Implications of Hyperbolic Discountingfor Project Evaluation 1 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1943,1998), available athttp://ssm.com/abstract=629111
(follow the "download document" link, last visited Mar. 3, 2008); Ben Groom et al., Declining
Discount Rates: The Long and the Short of It, 32 ENvTL. & RES. ECON. 445, 446-47 (2005). To see
why, assume a plan made in 2007 with effects extending over 100 years. According to
Weitzman's schedule of declining discount rates, the effects in year 2083 would be discounted
at a one-percent rate. See Weitzman, supra. However, as 2083 approached, our rate of discount
for those effects would rise in accordance with the discounting schedule, potentially altering
our plans. Some economists believe this is an insignificant problem. Heal, for example, notes
that individuals making plans at different times might as well be thought of as different
individuals. GEOFFREY HEAL, VALUING THE FuTURE: ECONOMIC THEORY AND SUSTAINABiLTY

(1998). Newell and Pizer, supra note 101, contend that even if time inconsistency of individual
preferences is a problem, hyperbolic discounting ceases to present that problem if it is based
not on individual preferences but on uncertainty over future events. As a practical matter,
time-inconsistency is probably no more problematic than policy changes resulting from
exogenous shocks or political shifts. See Groom et al., supra.
162. See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-1990 (1997),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/air/sect8l2/1970-1990/chptrl_7.pdf.
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schedule of declining discount rates in addition to its own preferred
parameter values. Given the inherently subjective nature of those values,
we might call for the adoption of a "best-practice" standard requiring not
just sensitivity analyses, but alternative sets of complete calculations under
various parameter values, perhaps including a presentation of the stream
of non-discounted future costs and benefits.
The same effect can be obtained - and arguably is obtained in the
case of climate change BCAs-by the independent generation of multiple
BCAs assessing the same social problems and policies utilizing different
parameter values. The Stern Review is not the only economic analysis we
have of climate change.1" The fact that other BCAs of climate change exist
arguably reduces the significance of the omissions, miscalculations, and
idiosyncrasies of any one set of analyses, conclusions, and recommendations. The various economic analyses and their critiques are all available,
along with this and other meta-analyses, in the "marketplace of ideas"1 " to
inform policy makers. In this respect, the Stern Review's "deviance" from
other economic analyses of climate change might be viewed as an
advantage, providing policy makers with a significantly
different but not
165
obviously illegitimate view of the same problem.
D. What's a Human Life or a Functional Ecosystem Worth?
Even if the Stern Review's exceptionally high damage estimates are
completely explained by the choice of parameter values, its failure to
plainly specify assumed valuations of non-market goods, including human
lives, is a glaring omission that certainly violates "best practices.""M6 Given

163. See, e.g., CuNE, supra note 3; NORDHAuS & BOYER, supra note 3; Mendelsohn et al., supra
note 3.
164. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The phrase is often mistakenly
attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in the earlier case of Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). While Holmes clearly articulated the idea, using expressions like
"free trade in ideas," he did not use the precise phrase "marketplace of ideas."
165. The physicist Francesco Calogero suggested something similar when he recommended
that the Brookhaven National Laboratory commission two separate assessments of the risk of
a catastrophic accident from the potential production of "strangelets" at its particle accelerator.
Specifically, he recommended that a "blue team" of experts be appointed to make an "objective
assessment," while a separate "red team" of experts played the role of "devil's advocate,"
coming up with high-danger scenarios that would challenge the "blue team." Francesco
Calogero, Might a Laboratory Experiment Destroy Planet Earth?, 25 INTERDISc. Sci. REvs. 191,
192-93 (2000), discussed in POSNER, supra note 12, at 190. As Posner notes, Calogero's
recommended approach envisioned "an adversary procedure similar to the clash of partydesignated expert witnesses at trial." Id. at 190.
166. Valuations of non-market goods, including human lives, are not important for every
BCA. However, where a BCA depends heavily on such valuations, as the Stern Review clearly
does, then it becomes essential for those valuations to be clearly and fully presented.
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the presumed importance of those values for the damage estimate, their
absence from the analysis is both perplexing and troubling. A reader of the
Stern Review has no way of determining whether (a) the author's valuations
are based on existing studies or their own best guesses, (b) the valuations
are similar to or deviate significantly from those supported in the literature,
and (c) the total damage estimates are calculated properly based on those
valuations. Lacking valuations of nonmarket damages, no subsequent
analyst could even attempt to replicate the Stern Review's damage
assessment. It is a given that any good BCA should provide enough
information for other analysts to replicate its results. In this respect, at least,
the Stern Review is not a good BCA.
E. Finally, a Couple of Positive Implications of the Stern Review
The implications of the Stem Review for the theory and practice of
BCA are not entirely negative. Arguably, it has made one or two highly
valuable positive contributions to the field. For one, it has demonstrated the
potential importance of paying attention not only to the mean of expected
values of present and future costs and benefits but also to low-probability,
high-magnitude (potential "low-g") events at the tails of damage distribution curves. As Weitzman notes, 167 events that are highly unlikely may
nevertheless be so significant for future consumption growth rates that they
simply must be accounted for in economic analyses. Nordhaus and Boyer
paid some attention to potentially catastrophic climate-change events,"6 but
the Stern Review is the first to focus its entire BCA beyond the mean estimate
of damages (including damages to non-market goods).
Accounting for high-damage scenarios (beyond mean estimates)
may not be important for economic analyses of standard, run-of-the-mill
government policies and projects. But for arguably special cases like climate
change, which combine unusually long time-horizons with very high levels
of Knightian uncertainty, worse-case scenarios should be treated seriously.
This, itself, constitutes a kind of precautionary principle. 6 9
A second positive lesson from the Stern Review for the practice of
BCA is not to be found in the Review itself, but in Sir Nicholas Stem's
willingness to engage his critics. As noted earlier, one of the major failings
of the Stern Review, as originally published, was the absence of a sensitivity
analysis to demonstrate the robustness of its conclusions across alternative
parameter values. Stem responded by adding a sensitivity analysis to the

167. Weitzman, supra note 1.
168. See NoRDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 3.
169. Weitzman asserts that cases like climate change, which involve structural uncertainties
and the potential for catastrophic events, may require the imposition of a "generalized
precautionary principle." Weitzman, supra note 9, at 22-24.
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Review as a postscript. Weitzman may be right that the postscript was a
"half-hearted" effort to placate the critics,17 ° but at least the Stem Review's
authors did it (and, of course, it was the right thing to do). Sir Nicholas
Stem, as lead author of the Stem Review, has also made himself available for
conferences and meetings devoted to criticizing his Review. For example, on
February 15, 2007, Sir Nicholas participated in a conference at Yale, where
he confronted some of his staunchest critics, including William Nordhaus
and Robert Mendelsohn. Not every author of every BCA would have been
so brave or open to disputation.
Stem's willingness to engage his critics reminds us that economic
analysis is a dynamic, iterative process, where the cycle of analysis and
criticism leads to improved analyses and further criticisms. In other words,
no BCA is an island. All ex ante economic analyses are provisional,
contestable, and revisable. They are in the nature of predictions, which are
bound to prove, on any ex post evaluation, more or less erroneous (which,
again, is not an argument against making the effort). The goal is to
minimize the likely range and amplitude of error. Stem explicitly
recognizes the provisional nature of ex ante BCAs in acknowledging that
the Stem Review is but "one contribution to [a] discussion."171
V. CONCLUSION
Anyone interested in BCA as a discipline should read both the Stem
Review and its serious academic critics because they raise serious issues
about the practice and practicability of BCA for long-run problems and
policies with potentially severe consequences under high levels of
Knightian uncertainty. Stern takes a strong position that such uncertainty
is not an excuse for inaction, especially where the stakes are enormous, as
is arguably the case with climate change. Whatever its analytical flaws,
Stem is surely right about that most important point, as Weitzman notes. 172
The Stem Review arguably carries special weight because it was
published as an official government document under the auspices of HM
Treasury. That can be the only reason for the extraordinary media attention
its publication received, in stark contrast to other economic analyses of
climate change quietly produced by university-based academics. The Stem
Review's government imprimatur created the risk that the Review might
disproportionately influence public policy not because of its merits relative
to other economic analyses but because of its pedigree. The implications of
that risk for the theory and practice of BCA are unclear. Perhaps we can

170. See Weitzman, supra note 1, at 7.
171. STERN, supra note 2, at 163.
172. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 723.
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take solace in the fact that after the initial surge of public and media
enthusiasm over the Stern Review, it has not significantly influenced policy
in Britain or elsewhere but has taken its place alongside other economic
analyses in the relative obscurity of academic discussions such as this one."73
At the same time, the Stern Review seems to have influenced how
other economists, including some of the Stern Review's staunchest critics,
approach the economics of climate change. After slamming the Review
when it was first published, Tol and Yohe more recently have suggested
that Stem and his co-authors "may be right" (albeit "for the wrong
reasons").174 Weitzman always suspected that might be the case." While
critical of the Stern Review's choice of parameter values, Weitzman thought
Stem was right to focus more attention on the potential for climate change
catastrophes. Since the Stern Review was published, Weitzman has been
working to improve the treatment of low-probability catastrophes in
climate change IAMs.176 Nordhaus, meanwhile, has amended his own DICE
IAM to reduce the pure rate of time preference (p) in half from 3 to 1.5,
although it is not clear whether the Stern Review played any role in this
decision."7
It is worth wondering how much more influential the Stern Review
might have been if the authors had (a) incorporated a sensitivity analysis
prior to publication; (b) rendered the calculations easily replicable by,
among other things, specifying valuations of nonmarket goods, including
human lives; and (c) presented its conclusions and recommendations with
less certainty and more modesty, in keeping with Stem's own cautions
about interpreting results from admittedly imperfect and fallible models."
To his credit, Stem never claimed that his conclusions and recommendations were the final word on the economics of climate change. He claimed
only to be making "a contribution to the discussion."179 Judged as such, the
Stern Review may be the most important contribution so far to the
economics of climate change.

173. I do not mean to suggest that inattention to the problem of climate change is a good
thing, only that policy should not be unduly influenced by a single, methodologically flawed
BCA.
174. Yohe et al., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
175. Weitzman supra note 1, at 710.
176. See Weitzman, supranote 9.
177. See supra note 142. In private correspondence, Nordhaus confirms only that he made
the change in order to simplify his model. E-mail message from William Nordhaus to Daniel
H. Cole (Oct. 17,2007) (on file with author).
178. STERN, supra note 2, at 161.
179. Id. at 657.

